Therein lies the WHOLE PROBLEM WITH THE ACCREDITED MANAGEMENT SYSTEM CERTIFICATION (MSC) sector. Most organizations want THE BENEFIT of supplier certificates, so they don't incur in onerous, repetitive, redundant audits of their suppliers, deciding, instead, to rely on a certificate as a means to keep the certified supplier in their approved supplier list. But when the supplier and/or their respective CB's show they don't deserve their trust, nothing of significance is done, other than (potentially) disqualifying the supplier. So, irresponsible CB's, without being forced to deliver confidence, are left free to grow their business.
Reliance on management systems certificates as a component of supplier monitoring and oversight REQUIRES the users of the certificates not only to be vigilant, but also keep the parties accountable to the process. If you are unwilling to engage with CB's and AB's about their performance, you should NOT rely on supplier system certificates for ANYTHING. It is analogous to people who complain about the political system but never vote, trying to change the situation.
I think MIREGMGR is being very responsible and diligent in his approach to this situation, but he represents the exception, not the rule. Most people mandating suppliers to attain certification to management system standards are utterly ignorant about the accredited certification process.
The only thing that will force AB's and CB's to clean up their acts and remain accountable to the intent of the process is the demand (by the users of certificates) for ACCOUNTABILITY at all levels, added by transparency.
What I wrote about the FDA applies equally to the CBs and the ABs
Yes. In general, I agree with the premise that one or two minor complaints should not lead to public reports which could trigger a panicked exodus by customers, plunging the regulated company into bankruptcy. The question arises about the level of nonconformance which should trigger such a public report. Should it be triggered by implementing a very short response deadline, which, when passed without resolution, means public exposure? Are customers willing to agree to the net cost of regulatory bodies hiring more competent investigators to implement the heightened regulatory activity? (The net cost comes from higher fees paid by regulated companies passed on to customers.)
What Sidney says about transparency of the process is imperative if we are to persuade organizations there is a benefit to reporting apparent discrepancies between certification status and actual practice of a registrant to a Standard.
If I'm John Doe, CEO of ABC Organization, I'd like to know if anybody else besides me is complaining. I'd like periodic progress reports of the status of the investigation. I'd like a very short timetable for answers from everyone up and down the line.
It is also true that relying solely on 3rd party certification prior to approving a supplier is very risky in the best of times. In a recession like our current one, however, it is tantamount to giving the keys to your new car to a drunk stranger who bumps into you at a tavern. The economic pressure of a recession tempts upper and middle managers to cut corners. I recall an infamous case in the aerospace industry where a supplier of titanium tubing decided to forgo the expense of inspection and merely duplicated the results of ONE inspection and reported it as the results of every inspection thereafter (and that was BEFORE 2008!)
So the question still remains:
How do we, as quality professionals, counsel upper management in our organizations to proceed? If we counsel redundant supplier site visits and nothing deleterious is found, we look like Chicken Little crying, "The sky is falling!"
Are there some signals we can be on the lookout for to trigger a site audit of a registered supplier?
How do we sell this to upper management without looking alarmist?
How do we justify our own existence and salary when a supplier we have approved turns traitor and "cheats?"
Should CBs be more alert and look for cues beyond the Standard "warned long in advance" audit?
Should a CB have a duty to alert end customers and users when the CB discovers one (or more) of its auditors has been "less than rigorous" in auditing certain companies, whether from incompetence, laziness, or collusion with the organization being audited?
Yes, Sidney, TRANSPARENCY of the process is key to protecting the system against total anarchy.
applause
