Trusting ISO 13485 Certification of a Supplier... A Sad Story

J

Julie O

"Trust but verify," especially in the context attributed to Reagan, is meant to be ironic, a polite way of expressing lack of trust.

Yes, it made sense to me when Reagan said it, because he was a politician, and presumably aiming for diplomacy.

You really don't want to get me started on hope, trust me on that. :lol:

I guess I'm just comfortable with "it is what it is," no need for trust or hope. Hmmm...I wonder if the other side of this coin might be that I'm not risk averse?
 

Ronen E

Problem Solver
Moderator
That which was verified was verified, no trust was involved. That which is not going to be verified is simply not going to be verified; it is not going to be trusted but verified. I see this as more of an example of "Verify some, and leave the rest to trust."

I'm in for that.

The rest is just wordsmithing.

Trust
Hope
Risk evaluation
"It is what it is"

At the end of the day it only matters what action has been taken (or not). Either you verify, or you don't. How you tag the latter, is less important - you still don't know. If it makes someone feel better to say that they didn't "trust", so be it. If something wasn't verified, and later went wrong, maybe the court would be interested in the decisions maker psychology, but other than that, the fact would still be that the thing wasn't verified. There is a difference between a conscious decision not-to-verify and a lapse to even consider (maybe the last one is what is referred above as "trust"; it's not what I mean when I use that word), however in both cases verification is void.

Verifying everything is not commonly a viable business attitude. It may well be discouraging not to know, however most business decisions are made under some non-negligible levels of uncertainty. Risk management can somewhat relieve the chaotic atmosphere but it doesn't change the fact that sometimes we need to make decisions without knowing everything we supposedly need to know. How do we do that? Some call it Trust, Hope, Intuition and the like. Some think that "Expert opinions" or "Experience" make it a bit more valid or rational. Others just avoid making the decisions...

Business decisions are seldom "All or Nothing". That works better for Regulatory Affairs.

Cheers,
Ronen.
 
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J

Julie O

At the end of the day it only matters what action has been taken (or not). Either you verify, or you don't.

It seems we are all in agreement on this point, and that how you deal with a lack of verification is essentially a matter of attitude. I think maybe "trust" makes me queasy because it sometimes feels more like denial than acceptance--all the more so when framed in terms of feeling better.

Business decisions are seldom "All or Nothing". That works better for Regulatory Affairs.

I think you must be referring to Compliance? Regulatory Affairs decisions ARE business decisions, typically fraught with sufficient complexity and uncertainty that neither "all" nor "nothing" is a viable option.
 
M

MIREGMGR

I'm trying to sort out how our QMS should be corrected to reflect how this currently works as a matter of rule. In particular, I'm trying to sort out whether the upstream aspects of ISO 13485 amount to a viable Corrective and Preventative Action mechanism under FDA rules.

Under the current standards and guidances:

Is a CB mandated to be aware (as soon as reasonably possible) of a regulatory action by a third party, such as an inspection-finding 483 or a Warning Letter issued by US FDA?

Is a CB, having learned of US FDA findings in a Warning Letter, mandated (after verifying the substance of the findings) to take action in regard to any corresponding non-conformances to ISO 13485?

Do I correctly understand per the above explanation of ISO 17011 that an AB is not mandated to take substantial action in the event that a CB does not take substantial action regarding an FDA Warning Letter, etc.?

If all of this is non-mandatory, I don't think it's acceptable under 21CFR 820.100.

If it's not acceptable under 21CFR 820.100, then my company's practice of relying partially or completely (depending on material/service criticality) on third party audits (i.e. ISO 13485 certificates) to implement supplier and material/service qualification under 21CFR 820 is out the window.

Looking back at this old thread, I don't think I'm any more comfortable with the problem I posed above:

If all of this (i.e. followup actions by CBs and ABs) is non-mandatory (and cost and business convenience are allowed considerations), I don't think it's acceptable under 21CFR 820.100.

This is relevant because of FDA's progress toward MDSAP, building on their experience with their current VARSP program which only allows selected CBs to participate. Apparently that participation determination is based on unpublished criteria for rigorousness and reputation, and apparently includes affirmative FDA knowledge of a good correlation between claimed rigor and client regulatory track record.

MDSAP is rumored to be the future of medical device maker inspection in the US. In that regulatory future, FDA inspectors no longer will do QSIT 1/2 inspections; instead all device makers will be required to participate in MDSAP, and FDA inspectors will perform only For Cause, emergency and special-case inspections.

It appears to be the plan that CB participation in MDSAP will work like with VARSP, i.e. FDA decides based on their own criteria, and nothing else is relevant.

If this comes to pass, it will directly address the core complaint I had at the beginning of this thread, which was that some CBs either weren't very good at their job or were looking the other way, and some ABs were not policing those CBs. If the MDSAP program works as I've surmised to date, there'll be no profit in the US/Canada/Brazil/Australia (so far) medical device sector for bad-actor CBs because (presumably) they won't be accepted into MDSAP, and I'm guessing no place for ABs in the medical device sector in those countries because FDA will have taken over that role.

Maybe this not-too-subtle indictment of the core validity of the CB/AB concept is why the EU so far is not participating in the MDSAP program.
 
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M

MIREGMGR

Orion promptly responded to my original inquiry, saying that they had not been aware of the issue and would look into it. I've had no further contact from them.

The supplier's website continues to display the now-expired ISO 13485 certificate.

My assumption is that for one reason or another, the certificate already was not in the process of being renewed at the time of my inquiry, and Orion regards the matter as no longer their problem since the certicate now is expired.

Heh. The above quote is from my 25 October 2011 post. As of that date, the Pharmaceutical Innovations website displayed the obsolete certificate.

I never heard back from Orion.

As of today, the P.I. website displays the certificate at this link (PDF), which supposedly became effective on 11 October 2011 even though the certificate signature is dated 03/09/2012. This certificate's stated period of validity would seem to encompass the events described in (broken link removed).

:lol:
 
R

Reg Morrison

Heh. The above quote is from my 25 October 2011 post. As of that date, the Pharmaceutical Innovations website displayed the obsolete certificate.

I never heard back from Orion.

As of today, the P.I. website displays the certificate at this link (PDF), which supposedly became effective on 11 October 2011 even though the certificate signature is dated 03/09/2012. This certificate's stated period of validity would seem to encompass the events described in (broken link removed).

:lol:
Orion was banned from the Canadian CMDCAS program, almost 10 years ago. https://www.hc-sc.gc.ca/dhp-mps/md-im/qualsys/index-eng.php#Registrars

The information contained on this thread is more than enough for someone from RvA to trigger a special audit of Orion and ascertain how it is possible for Orion to keep this ISO 13485 certificate valid with all the information at hand about their client PI. The question is: is RvA serious? how irrelevant are they? We know for a fact that many registrars are irrelevant. Apparently some accreditation bodies are, as well.
 
R

Reg Morrison

Not to disagree with you, but I am curious as to how we know this for a fact?
Very simple; the amount of anecdotal evidence in this forum alone of registrars that are utterly incompetent and certify systems which are not even close to complying with the standard make me consider it a fact.
And what do you mean by irrelevant? Irrelevant to what?
Irrelevant in providing assurance to stakeholders of what they are certifying is certifiable. In other words, they are not trustworthy. Have you asked yourself: "what is the meaning and purpose of a certificate?" Certificates that can not be trusted are irrelevant. And so are those issuing them.
 

Wes Bucey

Prophet of Profit
I may agree that "some" registrars are incompetent.

I am considered pretty good at connecting dots, filling in gaps, and reading between the lines, but I have no basis on which to quantify either a hard number or a percentage of " incompetent" registrars (or, more properly, incompetent field auditors.)

This is complicated by the concept that some may be competent, but venal or corruptible, further muddled by the fact in many cases neither audited company nor its customer really gives a rat's patootie for anything more than a piece of paper to fulfill a punch list.

So, what does "relevance" have to do with the system?
 
J

Julie O

And what is it about the system that permits incompetent/corrupt/irrelevant CBs to stay in business?
 
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